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Arbitration Agreements as Jurisdictional Boundaries, Rules and Challenges in Indonesia

article | Opini | 2025-06-28 08:00:42

As law students, we have been taught by our lecturer during college that courts have two main jurisdictions over civil and commercial cases namely absolute and relative. The term absolute denotes the specific competence that a court holds regarding the substantive matters that exist between different judicial bodies, a concept commonly known as attributive jurisdiction (Subekti, 1977:28). This highlights the unique ability of a court to exercise its authority over legal issues that are presented before it. Indonesian Supreme Court is structured on four primary courts, which include the General, Religious, Administrative, and Military tribunals. Conversely, the concept of relative jurisdiction pertains to the capacity of the same courts to resolve legal disputes that are determined by territorial boundaries, which is often referred to as distributive jurisdiction in legal terminology. Are there any other jurisdictional concepts that may impose restrictions on the Court's jurisdiction? The answer is yes; there is a concept known as Specific Jurisdiction, executed by an Extra Jurisdictional Body whose powers are conferred by law (Yahya Harahap, 2017:233). While the idea of this jurisdiction shares similarities with the concept of absolute jurisdiction, there exists a fundamental difference between the two in theory. The distinction lies in the institution that has the power to examine the case, which exists outside the four main judicial courts structured under the Supreme Court. The institution being referred to is the Arbitration. Arbitration represents a structured legal process in which parties engaged in a dispute agree to refer their case to a chosen tribunal, composed of one or more arbitrators who maintain independence and impartiality. These arbitrators are appointed directly by the involved parties or their representatives, which purposefully eliminates the court’s jurisdiction.Since the Dutch colonial era, Indonesia has recognized arbitration within its legal system, historically using the term ‘Juru Pisah’ to describe this process. Article 377 HIR/705 RBg outlines the regulations concerning the ‘Juru Pisah’, indicating that Indonesians and East Asians who wish to resolve their disputes through this method must adhere to the judicial procedures established for Europeans. According to this article, parties who opt for 'Juru Pisah' or arbitration to resolve their disputes are required to follow the provisions set forth in the Reglement of de Burgerlijk Rechts Vordering (RV) (S. U. T. Girsang, 1992:1). Within the RV, the rules governing arbitration are clearly defined in articles 615 to 651. With the promulgation of Law Number 30 of 1999 concerning Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, the arbitration provisions specified in the RV have been superseded and deemed void. The next question is which rule restricts the court's jurisdiction to hear a case in relation to the concept of Specific Jurisdiction? In the realm of arbitration, this provision is reflected in Article 3 of Law Number 30 of 1999, which states that “The District Court lacks the jurisdiction to resolve disputes involving parties that are subject to an arbitration agreement.” Article 11 paragraph (1) then emphasizes this by stating that, "When a written arbitration agreement is in place, the parties forfeit their right to bring any conflicts or differing opinions specified in the agreement before the District Court." Then, paragraph (2) imposes a responsibility on the Court to refrain from hearing a case, which states that, "The District Court is obliged to refuse and will not intervene in a dispute that has been conclusively addressed through arbitration." The arbitration agreement serves as the primary factor in establishing the Court's jurisdiction to review a case, according to these provisions. What are the types of agreements to arbitrate? In what ways do the parties and the court frequently overlook this clause? Typically, a modern or international commercial contract tends to include an arbitration clause that outlines the parties' commitment to resolve disputes through arbitration. Before any conflicts arise, the involved parties establish and agree upon arbitration clauses as part of the contractual agreement, which inherently anticipates future circumstances. While the parties naturally wish to prevent any disputes, they acknowledge that if one arises, it will be addressed through arbitration instead of court litigation. In addition to the more widely accepted forms of arbitration agreements, there exists a second, less frequently seen type where the parties involved come to a mutual understanding to submit an existing dispute to the arbitration process. This particular type of agreement is often referred to as a ‘submission agreement’. The details provided will typically exceed those found in an arbitration clause, as it allows for the selection of a tribunal and a comprehensive description of the dispute and the proposed methods for resolution once a conflict has emerged. Additionally, one can recognize a third category of arbitration agreement, which pertains to agreements to arbitrate that originate from international instruments, such as treaties, and are frequently labeled as 'investment arbitration. This newly established type of arbitration agreement grants qualifying investors, who hold qualifying investments, the ability to initiate international arbitration proceedings against a sovereign state, even if no contractual agreement exists between them.Thus, how this agreement to arbitrate is being frequently overlooked in practice? For the parties involved it usually happens because of the lack of awareness. A significant number of parties, especially those who are individuals or operate medium businesses, frequently do not comprehend what arbitration agreements entail or recognize their relevance during the contract-signing process. Even when they are assisted by lawyers, these clauses are frequently buried deep within lengthy and ‘boilerplate’ contracts (usually in consumer or employment agreements) making them easy to overlook. Moreover, during contract negotiations, the emphasis is typically on the main deal such as price, scope of work, and times-not a dispute mechanism, which may seem less urgent. On top of that, parties tend to be optimistic and assume there won’t be any disputes, so they don’t prioritize how they would resolve one. Conversely, judges sometimes neglect this clause due to their lack of diligence in examining the contract, coupled with the defendant's omission to contest the court's absolute jurisdiction. In addition, the parties indicated that they had set aside the arbitration clause by agreeing to take the case to the Court, and throughout the trial, the defendant did not raise any challenges. In relation to this issue, the Supreme Court has articulated its legal stance in Supreme Court Decision Number 3179/K/PDT/1984, dated May 4, 1988, stating that "in cases involving an arbitration clause, the District Court does not have the jurisdiction to examine and hear the case and the arbitration clause can only be waived through a mutual agreement that both parties must sign explicitly." Based on the above jurisprudence, if the parties wish to waive the arbitration agreement, it is not enough to just have an agreement stated verbally or through actions in court. Before the case is tried by the Court, the parties must first make a written agreement stating that the arbitration clause no longer has legal power. After all, it is essential for judges to initially assess the contractual agreement between the parties, and if an arbitration clause is identified, they are empowered by law to utilize their ex-officio authority to declare that the Court is not competent to adjudicate, as stipulated in Article 134 HIR/160 Rbg and 132 RV. Additionally, the norms established in Supreme Court Decision Number 317K/PDT/1984, issued on May 9, 1984, also support this viewpoint, indicating that if the defendant fails to raise an objection concerning the absolute jurisdiction derived from the arbitration clause, the judge is obligated to declare, on their own initiative, that the court lacks the jurisdiction to examine and hear the case. (Research and Development/fac)References:Subekti, Hukum Acara Perdata, Bina Cipta, Jakarta, 1977.Yahya Harahap, Hukum Acara Perdata Edisi Kedua, Sinar Grafika, Jakarta, 2017. S. U. T. Girsang, Arbitrase Jilid I, Mahkamah Agung RI, Jakarta, 1992. Blackaby, N., Partasides, C., Hunter, M., & Redfern, A. Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration 6th ed, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2015. 

Political Obligation: Rousseau and Hobbes perspective

article | Opini | 2025-06-15 05:00:58

For centuries, philosophers have debated the role of law in shaping political communities and institutions. Law is not merely a set of rules imposed on individuals, it is deeply intertwined with how societies conceive authority, order, justice and collective identity. Amongst the most influential thinkers in this domain are Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Both thinkers are key proponents of the social contract theory, a framework which posits that legitimate political authority arises from an implicit agreement among individuals to form a governed society. However, despite this shared foundation, they offer sharply contrasting perspectives on the nature of humanity, the necessity of government and the function of law within a society.Thomas Hobbes asserted that the natural state of humanity is one of unpredictability, characterised by perpetual insecurity and driven primarily by the instinct for self-preservation. He famously described life in this state as, “nasty, brutish and short”. This precarious condition fosters a pervasive sense of fear and the constant potential for violence. In such a state of nature, individuals possess a natural right or “right of nature”, to use any means necessary to protect their own lives. In order to move towards a more structured and secure society, Hobbes argued for a social contract where individuals rationally agree to submit to an absolute sovereign (typically in the form of a monarch). In his seminal work, Leviathan, Hobbes emphasises “the right of nature” as the liberty each person possesses to utilise their power for self-preservation. In the same stride, the “law of nature” is a set of principles that prohibits individuals from engaging in actions that would destroy their own lives. While the right to self-preservation remains inalienable, individuals in Hobbes social contract voluntarily relinquish the authority to judge threats or enact retributive justice, transferring this power to the sovereign.The sovereign's authority, therefore, becomes the sole arbiter of actions necessary for societal stability. Hobbes also emphasised that the laws of nature dictate the pursuit of peace, requiring individuals to surrender certain rights. In other words, everyone with reason should seek peace and be willing to give up their rights in order to achieve peace. The sovereign represents a unified “Leviathan” and is meant to ensure and safeguard peace, order and security by enforcing laws derived from reason. In fact, Hobbes justified the sovereignty of the ruler from their ability to protect the security of the political community.Hobbes advocated for a secular ruler (and state), prioritising obedience to the sovereign over religious doctrines, shifting away from the divine right of kings towards a system grounded in human agreement and the need for collective security. The primary purpose of the laws set by the sovereign is to prohibit actions that they deem problematic to peace and security. This means that even though the right to defend oneself is inalienable, in the scenario where a person poses a threat to the state and security, the sovereign can overrule the individual's right to life and liberty. In this sense, for Hobbes the essence of law lies in its being a command issued by a legitimate sovereign for its subjects, who are obligated to obey. He takes a positivist approach and distinguishes law from morality or justice. In fact he uses the term “right” or “just” to denote liberty and “law” or “lex” to indicate obedience that one owes to the state. Hobbes defines unjustice as the “not performance of a covenant” and justice as anything that is not unjust.Jean-Jacques Rousseau posited that humans are inherently good and altruistic in their natural state. However, societal structures and rules corrupt them, fostering selfishness and inequality. In his words “man is born free and he is everywhere in chains”. According to this, the formation of communities, tribes and states was driven by increasing population and interdependence. This led to the development of negative traits such as greed, envy, shame and pride. While acknowledging the necessity of a sovereign to maintain order, Rousseau critiqued how modern institutions such as law, property and the state have historically served to entrench class rule. In a sense, law and the state became an instrument to legitimize inequalities and allow the wealthy to oppress the poor. To deal with this, Rousseau insisted upon a social contract where people would collectively become the sovereign. His idea was quite similar to what we now know as ‘direct democracy’. The people would express their ideas through a general will that would aim for the common good, rather than individual good.According to Rousseau, since everyone participates in determining what is best for the whole, individual rights are surrendered to the sovereign. This is the maximum freedom attainable within a state and anyone with a dissenting opinion would be “forced to be free” by adhering to the collectively decided law. Laws and conventions are therefore needed to “join rights to duties and refer justice to its object”. Rousseau said that “in the state of nature, where everything is common, I owe nothing to him whom I have promised nothing; I recognize as belonging to others only what is of no use to me. In the state of society all rights are fixed by law, and the case becomes different.” The object of law is not personal, rather general. The law considers the mass its subject and can set up several classes of citizens but not nominate people into the said categories. Through this idea, Rousseau laid down the principle of equality, he emphasised that while the law can establish a monarchical government, it cannot choose a king or nominate a royal family. Legitimate laws arise from the general will and aim to create a most just society by ensuring that everyone is subject to the same rules. By obeying the laws that the people have themselves collectively willed, they achieve civic freedom and are protected from arbitrary rule. This makes the existence of a legislator or someone with much intelligence and connection to the people, incredibly vital in providing an objective and informed perspective on litigation in the political community.Hobbes and Rousseau both operate within the framework of social contract theory, believing that law and legitimate political authority are essential and arise from an agreement among individuals. They both also recognise the transition from a pre-political “state of nature” to a more structured political community governed by laws. However, a clearer comparison of both theorists indicates that the source and purpose of law differs for both. While Hobbes perceives law as an artificial construct that allows individuals to escape their perilous condition and establish structured society, for Rousseaulaw serves to restore and preserve equality and freedom within the modern social order. Hobbes also provides a bleak depiction of the natural state as a war of all against all driven by the inherent right to self-preservation. Rousseau is a lot more optimistic about the natural state and describes it as one of freedom and inherent goodness. Their ideas of society contrast greatly in this sense. While one sees society as a source of stability, the other insists that it is a corrupting force. Hobbes also views law as the absolute command of the sovereign. This means law is essential and an obligation for people to obey. In contrast, Rousseau sees law as the expression of general will, aiming to achieve liberty and the common good by reflecting the collective will of inherently good citizens.While Hobbes offers a pragmatic solution to the chaos of a lawless state, his emphasis on absolute sovereignty carries the risk of tyranny and the suppression of dissenting voices. Rousseau's concept of the general will, though complex, offers a more compelling vision of a political community. Law derives its legitimacy from the collective participation and consent of its citizens, aiming for the common good and fostering a sense of shared ownership over the rules that govern their lives. This focus on popular sovereignty and the pursuit of equality through law aligns more closely with modern democratic ideals. The practicality of actually achieving a representative “general will” is in fact debatable, especially in a context like ours. In Pakistan, many (most) people do not have access to education and information, which would make it difficult for them to contribute effectively to the narrative and legislative procedures. The underlying principle of law serving as an expression of collective autonomy and a tool for promoting everyone's rights, holds greater promise than Hobbes top-down approach. Rousseau's perspective is more ethically compelling and gives a more promising vision in terms of freedom, inclusivity and equality.*Mahnoor Kazmi - trainer of judges at the Punjab Judicial Academy Pakistan; and*Mahru Hasan Syed - Third Year Student of BA-LL.B Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan (Edited by Maria Christine Natalia Barus - Research and Development)

Anticipatory Breach, A Missing Piece In Indonesian Contract Law

article | Opini | 2025-06-07 21:00:30

Have you ever had your contract partner suddenly say they won't meet their obligations before the work begins? How did you feel? Frustrated? Disappointed? Betrayed?Nowadays, the world recognizes a new concept of breach called anticipatory breach, a breach of contract that is anticipated due to one party’s indication or strong intention that they will not fulfill their obligations. This type of breach occurs when one party to the agreement explicitly or implicitly states that they refuse to fulfill their obligations before the contract performance date. Consequently, it grants the other party the rights to immediately terminate the contract and claim damages before the actual breach occurs. It is considered efficient because of preventing further harm and providing earlier legal certainty to the harmed party. This concept is widely acknowledged in common law systems, for example in the United States and the United Kingdom. This concept is gaining popularity in modern legal practice, where certainty and efficiency are prioritized. However, no explicit provision regulating anticipatory breach exists in the Indonesian civil law system, which is still based on the Dutch-inherited Civil Code or Burgerlijk Wetboek, also known as the Indonesian Civil Code (hereafter as “BW”). In spite of the absence of explicit regulation concerning anticipatory breach, this writing explores the potential application of anticipatory breach within the Indonesian legal framework through progressive interpretation of existing norms. Besides, it seeks to foster academic discourse on the possibility and urgency of adopting the anticipatory breach in Indonesia’s legal system.In order to understand the prospective legal use of anticipatory breach in indonesian legal system, we must first examine what the difference between breach of contract stated in the BW and anticipatory breach is. Breach of contract or wanprestasi in the BW is the failure to execute an obligation that has been confirmed in a contract. It, as stated in Article 1243 BW, can be expressed in three forms: 1) failure to perform the obligation, 2) performing the obligation late, or 3) performing the obligation in a manner that does not comply with the agreed terms. In other words, breach of contract in the BW is referred to as a violation of the obligations as established in the contract.Meanwhile, anticipatory breach is declared when one party indicates, either explicitly or through clear actions, that they will not fulfill their contractual obligations before the agreed time for performance. Signaling the other party that the contract will not be executed as agreed is enough to make it as evident that they have no intention of fulfilling the contract, thus violating the terms even before the time for performance has arrived.Even though both concepts emphasize the violation of contract terms, they have notable features in terms of manner and timing. Whereas wanprestasi in BW refers to a failure to perform, delayed performance, or improper performance, anticipatory breach only need indication, either explicitly or through actions, that they will not fulfill the contract. In the aspect of timing, anticipatory breach addresses the breach before the actual performance date arrives while wanprestasi is declared when the performance is due and the obligation is unfulfilled. In other words, anticipatory breach is not recognized as a form of breach of contract under the BW.This lack of regulation creates legal gap that could be detrimental to the party acting in good faith. This circumstance often put the harmed party in uncertainty, having to choose between waiting for the actual breach or filing a lawsuit at the risk of being considered as making a premature filing. While the signs of a breach are crystal clear, a solid legal foundation to take immediate action before the breach actually occurs is often lacked by a party anticipating a breach by its contractual partner. Considering that situation and the increasing complexity and pace of commercial transactions, the importance of recognizing anticipatory breach has become more relevant as a preventive legal protection instrument.In this context, Article 1338 paragraph 3 BW and Article 1339 BW has regulated general principle in civil law, such as good faith, propriety and fairness. It is reasonable to suggest that it can be used as an interpretative basis to implicitly allow the application of anticipatory breach, because as Satjipto Rahardjo said, principle is the heart of norm. Therefore, in my opinion, a progressive interpretation of these principles could be a key to open the door for more adaptive and responsive legal protection in this modern and complex contractual agreement.As it said, the principles of good faith, propriety, and fairness can be interpreted to support anticipatory breach. For instance, the principle of good faith, as mentioned in Article 1338 paragraph (3) BW, requires that contracts shall be performed with honesty and sincerity. Expressing not to perform the contract explicitly can be considered a violation of this principle, becuase it indicates bad intent and causes harm to the other contracting party.Meanwhile, the principle of propriety, as set forth in Article 1339 BW, shall be executed in contract. Thus, the contract must be agreed upon in a fair and balance manner. In cases of anticipatory breach, a party’s unilateral decision not to fulfill its contractual obligations may be regarded as inappropriate owing to causing harm to the other party without just cause and disregarding the expectations and the equilibrium of rights and obligations between the parties.In addition, the principle of fairness, as prescribed in Article 1339 BW, emphasizes that contracts are binding not only for matters explicitly stated therein, but also for everything that, by the character of the agreement, is required based on fairness, custom, or statutory provisions. When one party declares an intention not to fulfill its obligations before the time for fulfillment, it can be considered a violation of the principle of fairness due to undermining the legitimate expectations of the other party to a fair execution of the contract. Accordingly, it is plausible to argue that these principles can provide a basis for implicitly supporting the application of anticipatory breach in legal interpretation.Moreover, the anticipatory breach concept in Indonesian contract law could be strengthened through a systematic interpretation of civil law principles. Notwithstanding emphasizing the enforceability of the agreements, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, as pursuant to Article 1338 BW, does not preclude the prospect of adjustment when a clear intention to breach the agreement is declared. This principle should not only be viewed as a binding force of agreement, but also a preventive measure against the contract breach if contract is not upheld. In other words, the law is required to be able to prevent harm by intervening at the right moment.To sum up, although there is no provision concerning anticipatory breach in BW, general principles in BW, such as good faith, propriety, and fairness can be taken as entry point for interpretation to implicitly accommodate this concept. It is because anticipatory breach can be seen as a violation of these principles. Hence, a progressive and systematic interpretation of these civil law principles is essential to provide more effective legal protection, prevent further harm, and ensure legal certainty.Theoretically, anticipatory breach can be viewed as a manifestation of the evolution of contract law functions in a complex modern society. As a result, it is crucial for Indonesia to consider the explicit recognition of anticipatory breach through civil law reform. Considering the needs of certainty and efficiency in contemporary commercial transactions, Indonesia needs to adjust its contract law to be more modern, adaptive and fair contract law system at the earliest opportunity. (Research and Development/Fac)Reference:Book:Harahap, M. Yahya. (1986). Segi-Segi Hukum Perjanjian. Jakarta: Alumni.H.S., Salim. (2019). Hukum Kontrak: Teori dan Teknik Penyusunan Kontrak. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika.Kartikawati, Dwi Ratna. (2019). Hukum Kontrak. Tasikmalaya: CV. Elvaretta Buana.Martono, Endro & Nugroho, Sigit Sapto. (2016). Hukum Kontrak dan Perkembangannya. Solo: Pustaka Iltizam.Rahardjo, Satjipto. (2000). Ilmu Hukum. Bandung: Citra Aditya Bakti.Subekti, R. (2005). Hukum Perjanjian. Jakarta: Intermasa.Journal:Cahyono, Akhmad Budi. (2020). Default and Termination of Contract: a Comparative Study Between Indonesia and the UK. Yuridika. Vol. 35 No. 3, 469-483. https://doi.org/10.20473/ydk.v35i3.17679-----. (2020). Implementation of Common Law Doctrine in Indonesian Law of Obligation. Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research. Vol. 130, 320-326. https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125937739.pdfMeyer, L. J. (1953). Anticipatory breach of contract—Effects of repudiation. University of Miami Law Review, 8(1), 68-75. https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3854&context=umlrNugraha, Delsa Wahyu, Setyawan, Fendi, & Soetijono, Iwan Rachmad. (2024). Global Impact of Breach of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts. Indonesian Journal of Innovation Studies Vol. 25, no. 2 (2024): 1074, https://ijins.umsida.ac.id/index.php/ijins/article/view/1074.S., M. Hillman Mehaga. (2022). Pengakhiran Kontrak Sebelum Terjadi Wanprestasi oleh Pihak yang Mengantisipasi Kegagalan Pelaksanaan Kewajiban. Dharmasisya: Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI Vol. 2, No. 2 (2022): 34. https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/dharmasisya/vol2/iss2/34.Sulistianingsih, Dewi, Wijaya, Christian Chandra, Yusof, Rahmawati Mohd & Adhi, Yuli Prasetyo. (2024). Juridical Consequences of Anticipatory Breach as a Form of Breach of o Contract. Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies Vol. 9 (Issue 1 (2024), 131-154. https://doi.org/10.15294/jils.vol9i1.4537

The Compendium of Good Practices in Adjudicating Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Cases in ASEAN

article | Berita | 2025-05-31 09:30:48

INTRODUCTIONThe ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) was signed on 21 November 2015, entered into force on 8 March 2017, and achieved universal ratification among ASEAN member states in 20203. Achieving this requires continued collaboration and coordination to strengthen the regional judicial response to Trafficking in Persons, particularly through capacity building of law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges, as mandated by ACTIP, the ASEAN Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (APA) and the Multi-Sectoral Action Plan ASEAN Against Trade 2023-2028 (Bohol Work Plan 2.0).Recognizing this, CACJ has received a proposal from ASEAN-ACT for a pilot project on judicial knowledge exchange. Specifically, at the 10th CACJ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Council stated: “RECOGNIZING the approach taken by ASEAN-Australia Counter Trafficking (ASEAN-ACT) with a view to supporting the implementation of the Judicial Education and Training Programme in line with the priorities of the Work Plan 2020-2025, AGREEMENT for the Judicial Education and Training Working Group to explore the suitability of the Working Group’s priorities and to submit its recommendations to the CACJ for approval before implementation.” (Paragraph 14, Kuala Lumpur Declaration). In accordance with this declaration, the CACJ WG-JET Co-Chairs implemented the JKE Pilot Project between Indonesia and the Philippines to evaluate the feasibility of the proposal. Two exploratory activities were held in July and September 2023, resulting in an exchange of knowledge between Indonesian and Philippine judges. These activities focused on sharing good practices and challenges in adjudicating TIP cases, particularly in applying the victim approach, normalizing the use of ASEAN mechanisms for information exchange and capacity building in implementing ACTIP across countries. ASEAN members.  A joint consolidation workshop was also held in May 2024. The Policy Strategy and Legal and Judicial Education and Training Agency, the Philippine Judicial Academy, the Supreme Court of Indonesia, the Supreme Court of the Philippines and ASEAN-ACT were tasked with compiling a summary of lessons learned and good practices from the JKE Pilot Project, which will serve as a resource for judges and legal practitioners across the ASEAN region.SUBSTANCEa. On 24-27 July 2003, in Bogor, Indonesia, the ASEAN Judicial Knowledge Exchange was conducted. Delegates from Indonesian and Philippine Judges explored important practices, such as providing restitution and compensation to victims, implementing a special approach for child witnesses, and using victim-sensitive methods for victim-sensitive testimony. Philippine judges and jurors also visited district and religious courts in Indonesia, where they observed how technology improves access to justice for women, children, and persons with disabilities. In July 2023, the Supreme Court of Indonesia and the Agency (Strategy, Policy, and Education and Training of Law and Justice (BSDK) were honored to host judges from the Philippines in Bogor and Jakarta for the first phase of the JKE Pilot Project. The exchange resulted in rich discussions among 17 Indonesian and 12 Philippine judges on indicators of victim-sensitive courts, juvenile courts, and child-sensitive courts.b. On September 19-21, 2023 in Tagaytay and Manila, Philippines In September, the Philippine judiciary had the honor to welcome in Manila and Tagaytay distinguished colleagues from Indonesia including Jupriyadi, SH, MHum (Supreme Court Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia), 2. Hj Dr Nirwana, SH, M.Hum (Central Sulawesi KPT), Hon. Judge Bambang Hery Mulyono, SH, MH Head of Indonesia Judicial Training Agency, Supreme Court of Indonesia Judge Dr. Sriti Hesti Astiti, SH, MH Judicial Judge, Agency for Policy Strategy and Education and Training of Law and Justice, Mr. Taufikurrahman Head of Program and Cooperation Sub-Section, Center for Education and Training, Agency for Policy Strategy and Education and Training of Law and Justice, Mr. Ardy Nugroho Putra, SH Head of Administration Sub-Section, Center for Education and Training, Agency for Policy Strategy and Education and Training of Law and Justice, Ms. Ika Lestari Program and Cooperation Staff, Center for Education and Training, Agency for Policy Strategy and Legal and Judicial Education and Training Participants, Judge Dr. Rosana Kesuma Hidayah, S.H., M.SI Judicial Judge at Registrar's Office of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Judge Eva Margareta Manurung, S.H., M.H. Judicial Judge at Public Relations of Administration Affairs Board, Administration Affairs Board of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Judge Dodik Setyo Wijayanto, S.H. Judicial Judge at Registrar's Office of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Judge Ferdian Permadi, S.H. Judicial Judge at Registrar's Office of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Judge Delta Tamtama, S.H., M.H. South Jakarta District Court, Judge Syofia Marlianti Tambunan S.H., M.H. North Jakarta District Court, Judge Flowerry Yulidas, S.H., M.H West Jakarta District Court, Judge Dwi Novita Purbasari, S.H Rangkasbitung District Court, Judge Adrian Anju Purba, S.H., LL.M. Indramayu District Court, Judge Alfian Wahyu Pratama, S.H., M.H. Mungkid District Court,Judge Maulia Martwenty Ine, S.H., M.H. Head of Kediri District Court, Judge Adhika Budi Prasetyo, S.H., MBA., M.H. Kediri District Court, Judge Wini Noviarini, S.H., M.H. Tanjung Karang District Court, Judge Dr. Novritsar Hasintongan Pakpahan, S.H., S.Pd., LL.M Kotabumi District Court, Judge Maria Christine Natalia Barus, S.IP., S.H., M.H Stabat District Court, Judge Muhammad Larry Izmi, S.H., M.H. Bangkayang District Court Supreme Court of Indonesia, Hon. Justice Jupriyadi, S.H., M.Hum. Justice of Criminal Chamber at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Judge Dr. Hj. Nirwana, S.H., M.Hum Chief Judge of Central Sulawesi High Court, Judge Selviana Purba, S.H., LL.M Judicial Judge / CACJ Indonesia Liaison Officer, Judge Dr. H. Armansyah, Lc. M.H. Judicial Judge of the Religious Court Chamber, Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Judge Rizkiansyah, S.H., LLM. Judicial Judge at the Public Relations Legal BureauThe team had an in-depth exchange on family court practices, including child-sensitive procedures, which deepened our understanding and enhanced our ability to implement practical and effective approaches to combating trafficking across ASEAN. These interactions not only enriched our judicial knowledge, but also provided valuable lessons that are now summarized as a lasting resource to guide and inspire future efforts. Moreover, this summary serves as a reminder for us to continue to build on this progress, to continue to improve how we support victims, and to work more closely with each other to make a real difference.On 14-16 May 2024 in Tangerang, Indonesia by Indonesian Judges and in Manila by Manila Judges held a follow-up meeting online via zoom to formulate the results of the first meeting (24-27 July 2003 in Bogor) and the second meeting (19-21 September 2023 in Tagaytay and Manila, Philippines) so that from this joint project represented by the CACJ Philippines as Chair of the Working Group Chair of the CACJ Working Group on Judicial Education and Training (WGJET) and our partners from ASEAN - Australia Counter Trafficking (ASEAN-ACT) produced the Compendium of Good Practices in Adjudicating Trafficking In Persons Cases in ASEAN Member States: Lessons Learned and Responses to Challenges. This is an important milestone for the WG-JET to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary in adjudicating trafficking in persons (TIP) through the implementation of the ASEAN Judicial Knowledge Exchange pilot project (Pilot JKE Project). This compendium was developed by CACJ Indonesia and the Philippines in their capacity as Co-Chairs of CACJ WG-JET with support from ASEAN-ACT. This Compendium This Compendium aims to document the knowledge sharing of judges from Indonesia and the Philippines in adjudicating TIP Trafficking in Persons cases under the JKE Pilot Project. This Compendium will serve as a summary of good practices in adjudicating TIP cases across the ASEAN region. This Compendium is a living document that contains lessons learned and responses to challenges faced for future judicial knowledge exchange, provides insights and serves as an additional reference on victim-sensitive TIP adjudication. This Compendium is intended to broaden understanding among judges and stakeholders and to promote innovation in ASEAN.CONCLUSIONAccess to justice is a fundamental principle of the rule of law. Without it, individuals cannot have their voices heard, exercise their rights, challenge discriminatory practices, or hold decision-makers to account. The delivery of justice must be impartial and non-discriminatory. To ensure meaningful access to justice, especially for vulnerable groups such as victims of trafficking, mechanisms and systems must be in place for fair dispute resolution, redress for human rights violations, and accountability for wrongdoing. People must be aware of their rights, empowered to claim them, and free to make their own choices throughout the process. This activity resulted in a compendium entitled The Compendium of Good Practices in Adjudicating Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Cases in ASEAN Member States: Lessons Learned and Responses to Challenges.This Compendium, together with three outcome documents, namely, 1. Framework for Judicial Knowledge Exchange on TIP Adjudication in ASEAN, Consolidated. 2. Summary Report for the exchange in Indonesia and the Philippines in 2023. 3. Report of the JKE Pilot Project Consolidation Workshop in May 2024, marking the completion of the JKE Pilot Project by the WG-JET Co-Chairs. CLOSING The entire series of activities of the ASEAN Judicial Knowledge Exchange on Victim-Sensitive Adjudication of Trafficking in Persons Cases: Consolidation Workshop was closed on 16 May 2024, as a joint project between Indonesia and the Philippines with ASEAN - Australia Counter Trafficking (ASEAN-ACT) partners, resulting in The Compendium of Good Practices in Adjudicating Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Cases in ASEAN Member States: Lessons Learned and Responses to Challenges.  (Research and Development/fac/bs)

Appreciation for the Regular Meeting Activity of Perisai Badilum

article | Opini | 2025-05-24 15:30:55

The Regular Meeting and Interactive Sarasehan organized by the Directorate General of the General Judiciary (Badilum) through the Perisai Badilum forum is a progressive initiative that deserves high appreciation. In this era of continuous judicial modernization, such activities are not only important but essential in maintaining the spirit of professionalism and integrity among judges and technical staff within the general judiciary.The Sarasehan, which discusses relevant and practical themes in the judiciary, creates a valuable space for court personnel to exchange experiences, engage in academic discussions, and contribute constructive insights on legal dynamics and judicial practices. This effort aligns closely with the spirit of bureaucratic reform and the ongoing renewal of the national legal system encouraged by the Supreme Court.These regular meetings have a broad positive impact, ranging from increasing legal knowledge and critical thinking skills to fostering a culture of healthy and scholarly discourse. For judges and technical staff, this forum provides a platform for reflection and a means to gain new perspectives in addressing real-world legal challenges.Moreover, holding the activity virtually demonstrates Badilum's adaptability to technological advancement. It allows wider and more inclusive access for all judicial work units throughout Indonesia, free from geographical constraints. This digital transformation should be commended as concrete proof that digital reform in the judiciary is not just a slogan but a practiced reality.As members of the judiciary, we greatly benefit from forums like Perisai Badilum. Such platforms bridge interregional dialogue needs, strengthen solidarity, and enhance communication and collaboration networks between judicial units.We extend our sincere gratitude and deep appreciation to the Directorate General of the General Judiciary for its unwavering commitment to creating high-quality and inspiring dialogue spaces. We hope that this program will continue consistently and be enriched with new innovations to expand its benefits.Through initiatives like this, we hope to cultivate a new generation of judicial officers who are not only legally proficient but also critical thinkers, open to dialogue, and committed to the values of integrity, transparency, and justice. May Perisai Badilum continue to serve as a productive and enlightening forum in strengthening Indonesia’s judiciary.

When AI Meets Integrity: The Data-Driven Overhaul of Justice in Indonesia

article | Opini | 2025-05-17 20:00:33

The judicial system is fundamentally tasked with upholding the rule of law and ensuring justice for all. In the context of combating corruption within the judiciary, two critical approaches emerge: the implementation of AI-driven profiling systems and the integration of ethical oversight mechanisms. The former focuses on utilizing advanced technology to identify and mitigate risks associated with judicial misconduct, while the latter emphasizes the importance of human governance and accountability in decision-making processes.AI-driven profiling systems leverage data analytics and machine learning to proactively detect patterns of corruption and bias within judicial practices. By analyzing vast amounts of structured and unstructured data, such as court case histories and financial disclosures, these systems can highlight potential ethical vulnerabilities before they escalate into misconduct. This proactive approach not only enhances the predictive accuracy of risk assessments but also fosters a culture of transparency and accountability within the judiciary.Conversely, ethical oversight mechanisms are essential to ensure that the deployment of AI technologies does not undermine judicial independence. Human oversight remains a critical component, as it allows judges to review AI-generated recommendations and provide context that machines may overlook. This human-in-the-loop approach ensures that decisions are not solely based on algorithmic outputs but are informed by the nuanced understanding of legal principles and individual circumstances.In Indonesia, the integration of these approaches is particularly relevant, given the systemic vulnerabilities that have historically plagued the judiciary. The establishment of an AI-driven profiling system, grounded in ethical safeguards and transparency, can empower Chief Justices to better assess risks and uphold judicial integrity. By combining technological advancements with robust human oversight, the judiciary can effectively combat corruption while maintaining the essential principles of fairness and impartiality.The importance of transparency in this context cannot be overstated. Tools such as SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) and LIME (Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations) play a pivotal role in elucidating the decision-making processes of AI systems. These tools provide insights into how various factors influence judicial outcomes, enabling stakeholders to scrutinize and challenge decisions that may be biased or unjust. For instance, in cases where AI models have historically favored certain demographics, the application of SHAP can reveal the underlying biases, prompting necessary adjustments to ensure equitable treatment.Ultimately, the challenge lies in striking a balance between leveraging technological innovations and safeguarding the rights of all parties involved—both the accused and the victims. As the judicial system evolves, it is imperative that judges remain vigilant in their duty to uphold justice, ensuring that the rights of individuals are protected while also addressing the pressing issue of corruption within the judiciary. The interplay of AI-driven profiling systems and ethical oversight mechanisms represents a forward-looking solution to enhance the integrity of judicial processes, fostering public trust and reinforcing the rule of law.*Judge at the Research and Development Center for Law and Judiciary, Supreme Court of Indonesia